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awarded. 9 The facts of this case tend to show that some agent of
the defendant acted with a fraudulent motive or else with such gross
negligence as to display a reckless disregard for the plaintiff's rights.
In view of the aggravated nature of the offense of altering the check
and the fact that the altered instrument operated to charge plaintiff
with the crime of issuing a check without funds, it is submitted that
the jury verdict may be upheld, although the actual loss to the plain-
tiff through loss of credit and damage to business reputation prob-
ably was slight under the circumstances.' 0
TRAVIS BROWN.
Marriage and Divorce-Annulment-Marriage in Jest
Infant plaintiff brought an equitable petition by her next friend
for the purpose of annuling her marriage to the defendant. She
alleged that she was fifteen years old and that the defendant was
nineteen, and that both resided with and were dependent upon their
respective parents. While attending a dinner dance, in a spirit of
fun, braggadocio, and levity, the parties began to dare each other to
get married. They drove across the state line into Alabama, procured
a license from a probate judge by means of falsifications by the de-
fendant as to their ages, and were married. Plaintiff alleged that
she returned home and had never lived with the defendant. De-
fendant entered a general demurrer for want of equity and on the
ground that the court of equity "was without jurisdiction or power
to annul a marriage under any circumstances." Held, demurrer
sustained.'
Two questions are presented in the case. The first, whether or
not a court of equity has jurisdiction to annul a marriage, had never
been adjudicated in Georgia and was left open by the court. There
are many cases which have decided that equity has such jurisdiction.
12 MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING (5th ed., 1917) §458. See Winkler v.
Citizens' State Bank, 89 Kan. 279, 131 Pac. 597, 598 (1913); American Nat.
Bank v. Morey, 113 Ky. 857, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 658, 69 S. W. 759, 760, 101 Am.
ST. REP. 379, 58 L. R. A. 956 (1902) ; McCormick, Some Phases of the Doctrine
of Exemplary Damages (1930) 8 N. C. L. Rzv. 129.
" The plaintiff was insolvent at the time of the alleged occurrences leading
to the suit. It was not proved that the defendant's action contributed any sub-
stantial part to the plaintiff's going into bankruptcy thereafter.
'Hand v. Berry, 154 S. E. 239 (Ga. 1930).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Some of them hold that the power is inherent,2 others that it is con-
ferred upon the courts by statute,3 and still others that it is a part
of the general power of a court of equity over contracts. 4
The second question presented is whether or not on the facts the
marriage could be set aside if jurisdiction existed. The law of the
place of contracting governs with regard to matrimonial capacity of
parties as well as with respect to the manner or form of solemniza-
tion or annulment.5 It appears that the parties were capable of con-
tracting a valid marriage in Alabama.6 The fraud of defendant in
falsifying their ages in order to secure a license without the written
consent of their parents did not render the marriage voidable on
that ground.7 But, granting the capacity of the parties and assum-
ing that the court had jurisdiction, it held that the facts did not con-
stitute grounds for annulment. The basis for the decision is that the
state has decreed that when capable parties consent to the pronounce-
ment of a certain ceremony by the proper official that they are united
as man and wife. A very strong majority opposes this view on the
ground that it is real consent to assume the obligations and rights of
that status which validates the contract.8 The words are the ex-
ternal manifestation of intention, but mere words without any inten-
tion corresponding to them cannot make a marriage or any other civil
contract, unless they are justifiably and reasonably taken at their face
value.9 The legal forms are not a substitute for legal consent, they
are but modes of declaring and substantiating it.10 Actual mutual
consent and a bona fide agreement are fundamental and essential
2Meredith v. Shakespeare, 96 W. Va. 229, 122 S. E. 520 (1924) ; Dorgelah
v. Murtha, 92 Misc. Rep. 279, 156 N. Y. Supp. 181 (1915).
'Johnson v. Kincade, 37 N. C. 470 (1843).
'Corder v. Corder, 141 Md. 114, 117 Atl. 119 (1922) ; Clark v. Field, 13 Vt.
460 (1841).
'Powell v. Powell, 282 Ill. 357, 118 N. W. 786 (1918) ; Great Northern v.
Johnson, 254 Fed. 683 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918).8Ala. Code (1923) §8999. But see: Quigg v. Quigg, 42 Misc. Rep. 48, 85
N. Y. Supp. 550 (1903) ; Kellog v. Kellog, 122 Misc. Rep. 734, 203 N. Y. Supp.
757 (1924); Swenson v. Swenson, 179 Wis. 536, 192 N. W. 70 (1923).
'Smith v. Smith, 205 Ala. 503, 88 So. 577 (1921) ; Bays v. Bays, 105 Misc.
Rep. 492, 174 N. Y. Supp. 212 (1918) ; Fodor v. Kunie, 92 N. J. Eq. 301, 112
AtI. 598 (1920).
"Crouch v. Wartenberg, 86 W. Va, 664, 104 S. E. 117 (1920) ; Note (1921)
11 A. L. R. 215.
'McClurg v. Terry, 21 N. J. Eq. 225 (1870) ; Regina v. Millis, 10 Clark &
F. 534 (1844).
"1 BISHOP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND SEPARATION (1921) §§296 and 337;
SPENCER, DOMESTIC RErATIONS (1923) §§37 and 82.
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elements," without them the marriage is voidable,12 unless it is rati-
fied by consummation. 13
The cases preponderate in favor of annulment of marriages con-
tracted in jest.14 Social policy dictates that a contract of such im-
portance to the race shall not be unintentionally assumed. Where it
appears that the parties never had the intention of fulfilling the
obligations of the contract, it would seem to be more just to both the
state and to the parties to restore them to statu qua.
C. E. REITZEL.
Negligence-Automobiles--Duty of Guest
Two actions (consolidated by consent) were brought against the
owner of an automobile and his wife, who was driving, to recover
damages for personal injuries sustained by a guest, and caused by
the alleged negligence of the driver while operating the car. Judg-
ment against the wife was sustained, the court holding that the
owner was relieved of any liability by the finding of the jury that
his wife was not operating the car as his agent. Testimony of cau-
tion by the guest to the driver was held competent on the question
of the driver's negligence.'
The above statement of the owner's liability raises serious doubt
in view of the court's previous adoption of the "family purpose"
doctrine.2 There is no indication that the court is overruling the
previous holding of modifying the doctrine, although the language
would seem to restore the owner's liability to an agency basis.3
The testimony as to the warning is admissible either to show a
compliance with the guest's duty to warn, if any,4 or as evidence
tending to show negligence on the part of the driver., Such a state-
' Crouch v. Wartenberg, supra note 9.
" McClurg v. Terry, spra note 10; Hall v. Hail, 24 Times L. P, 756
( 8rooke v. Brooke, 60 Md. 524 (1883) ; Macri v. Macri, 164 N. Y. Supp.
112, 177 App. Div. 292 (1917); Arado v. Arado, 281 Ill. 123, 117 N. E. 816,
4 A. L. R. 28 (1917); Martin v. Otis, 233 Mass. 491, 124 N. E. 294 (1919);
Americus Co. v. Coleman, 16 Ga. App. 17, 84 S. E. 493 (1915).
14 Note (1921) 11 A. L. R. 215.
'Teasley etal. v. Burwell et al., 199 N. C. 18, 153 S. E. 607 (1930).
'Goss v. Williams, 196 N. C. 213, 145 S. E. 119 (1928); (1927) 5 N. C.
L. Rav. 252; (1928) 6 N. C. L. IEv. 78; McCall, The Family Automobile
(1930) 8 N. C. L. Rsv. 256.
'Linville v. Nissen, 162 N. C. 96, 77 S. E. 1096 (1913) ; Tyree v Tudor,
183 N. C. 340, 111 S. E. 714 (1922); Watts v. Lefler, 190 N. C. 722, 130 S. E.
630 (1925).
'McAdd v. Shea, 10 La. App. 733, 122 So. 879 (1929).
'Hiller v. De Sautels, 169 N. E. 494 (Mass. 1929).
